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ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to explore the
impact of commercial marketing on personal autonomy.
Several philosophers argue that marketing conflicts with
ideals of autonomy or, at best, is neutral to these ideals.
After qualifying our concept of marketing and introduc-
ing the distinctions between (i) divergent and convergent
marketing and (ii) being autonomous and acting auton-
omously, we demonstrate the heretofore unnoticed posi-
tive impact of marketing on autonomy. Specifically, we
argue that (i) convergent marketing has a significant
potential to reinforce autonomous action and (ii) diver-
gent marketing has a significant potential to reinforce the
state of being autonomous.
KEY WORDS: autonomous agency, being an autono-
mous person, divergent and convergent marketing, cul-
tural values, critical reflection, first- and second-order
desires
Introduction
The debate over the impact of marketing on personal
autonomy predominantly concerns the degree to
which marketing overrules autonomy. Commenta-
tors fall into two camps. The hardliners argue that
marketing is hostile to autonomy and, more often
than not, overrules the ability to develop and exer-
cise personal autonomy (Barrett, 2000; Crisp, 1987;
Raley, 2006; Sneddon, 2001), whereas the chal-
lengers argue that marketing is, to a considerable
extent, compatible with the exercise of autonomy
(Arrington, 1982; Cunningham, 2003). Both camps
assume, however, that the impact of marketing on
autonomy is negative or neutral, but never positive.
In contrast, we argue that, under some circumstances,
marketing can contribute positively to autonomous
agency and the state of being autonomous.
First, we offer an initial clarification of the con-
cepts of marketing and autonomy, which is essential
to understanding the argument presented in this
article. Later on, we provide a more detailed account
of the concepts. According to the American Mar-
keting Association (AMA, 2008), marketing is the
activity for creating, communicating, delivering, and
exchanging offerings that have value for customers,
clients, partners, and society at large. The AMA-
definition is clearly a normative one in that mar-
keting is not necessarily a vehicle for offerings that
have value for consumers. Marketing certainly may,
and quite often does, have value for consumers, but
not always. However, taken as a normative state-
ment about marketing that we should try to achieve
in practice, the definition proves to be very useful.
We limit our focus to strategic marketing com-
munications that attempt to induce a desire or
preference by linking a commercial product or a
corporate organization to a symbolic value or set of
symbolic values in the mind of the consumer (e.g.,
branding).
The discussions in this article refer to, and build
on, analyses of advertisements, but the arguments
apply to any kind of marketing communication
aimed at linking symbolic values to products. Thus,
though we do not refer to them, we constantly keep
in mind marketing communications such as word-
of-mouth and viral marketing, product placements,
events and sponsorships, which are suitable vehicles
for linking products with symbolic values.
We will now turn to the question: what is per-
sonal autonomy? We distinguish between autono-
mous agency and the state of being autonomous.
Fundamental to our account of autonomous
agency is the powerful idea that acting freely is a
question of acting in accordance with and because of
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one’s own will or motivations. However, taken
without qualifications, this basic idea is flawed be-
cause, in some cases, it allows persons acting on
compulsions to be characterized as acting autono-
mously. For example, a drug addict could be said to
act autonomously insofar as he or she wants the
drugs and takes them exactly because of this want
(Frankfurt, 1971; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002).
One solution to the problem is to distinguish
between various kinds of motivational elements or,
put differently, to distinguish between a person’s
effective or immediate desires as opposed to his or
her more fundamental ones. One way of doing so is
to follow the lines of Frankfurt (1971) and introduce
a distinction between first- and second-order desires,
where a first-order desire expresses ‘‘what one
wants’’ and a second-order desire expresses ‘‘what
one wants to want.’’ Against this qualification we
hold that a person acts autonomously to the extent
that his or her effective first-order desires match his
or her more fundamental second-order ones.
Assuming that the aforementioned drug addict has
a second-order desire not to take drugs, but that his
first-order desire to take them is the stronger one,
we can reasonably make the claim that he is acting
against his own will and, therefore, not acting
autonomously. (We elaborate on this account of
autonomy in the section ‘‘How convergent mar-
keting reinforces autonomy.’’)
The concept of autonomous agency can also be
illustrated similar to this: As Ted passes the bakery, a
desire for a doughnut arises (first-order desire).
However, Ted is concerned about his health; he
believes that doughnuts are unhealthy, and, thus, he
also wants not to buy a doughnut (second-order de-
sire). Ted experiences a will-conflict. Our core idea of
autonomous action holds that, if Ted’s desire not to
eat the doughnut is mostly important to him (i.e., if it
is of the second-order) then he acts autonomously to
the extent that he defeats his desire (of the first order)
to buy the doughnut. And vice versa.
One challenge, some times referred to as the
‘‘source problem’’ (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002),
needs to be addressed. If a person acts on a funda-
mental second- order desire, which is acquired
through some form of manipulation, say powerful
marketing, he or she should not be said to act
autonomously even though the effective first-order
desire or motivation flows from the more funda-
mental second-order one (Wolf, 1990). Our answer
to this very strong objection is twofold.
First, the objection assumes that the ability to
form one’s desires independently of external influ-
ences is a requirement of autonomous agency. As
Crisp (1987) notes, this requirement is certainly too
strong because it is hardly believable that any of our
actions flow from motivations that are totally in the
control of our will and insensitive to external
influences (e.g., socio-cultural determinants).
Second, the distinction between ‘‘identification’’
and ‘‘alienation’’ makes a difference as to whether or
not acting on a manipulated desire counts as
autonomous agency. The rationale is that an agent
acting on a desire with which he or she identifies is
acting wholeheartedly and, therefore, could not be
said to act involuntary. Moreover, since none of our
desires are formed independently of external influ-
ences, identification seems to be a reasonable crite-
rion of autonomous agency (Frankfurt, 1988a, b;
Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002). Accordingly, we suggest
that an action flowing from an induced second-order
desire is autonomous to the extent that the agent
identifies with that second-order desire.
Now let us focus on the notion of being auton-
omous. On a coherentist account of autonomy, a
person is autonomous to the extent that he or she
assesses his or her fundamental desires and beliefs and
endorses them in light of critical reflection (Buss,
2008). Autonomy, then, is a matter of a person’s
desires and beliefs being consistent with his or her
reflective reasoning.
However, as was the case with the account of free
agency outlined above, a strict coherentist account
of being autonomous gives rise to the source prob-
lem, because induced desires might very well cohere
with a fair deal of ones desires, beliefs and values –
even on critical reflection.
Most philosophers tend to hold that the require-
ments for being an autonomous person are stronger
than the requirements for autonomous agency.
Thus, identification is not a sufficient test, and we
have to look for another solution. What is some-
times dubbed responsiveness-to-reason account of
autonomy provides a strong answer to the source
problem associated with the coherentist view of
autonomy.
Roughly put, the responsiveness-to-reason account
holds that an agent is autonomous if he or she
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satisfies two requirements. First, autonomy requires
the capability of stepping back from one’s desires and
values and critically reflecting on them. Second,
autonomy requires the ability of changing one’s life
in response to this reflective reasoning (Buss, 2008;
Christman, 1991; Dworkin, 1988; Mele, 1995;
Wolf, 1990).
In order to illustrate the two notions of being
autonomous, think of the case of Mark. Mark has a
strong desire to become a professional footballer.
However, on critical reflection, he does not endorse
this desire because – to be perfectly honest to himself –
he does not have what it takes. Thinking coolly about
his desire it occurs to him that having that desire
might cause severe frustration in the long run. Mark
would rather not like to have that desire.
On a strict coherentist account of autonomy,
Mark is not autonomous with regard to his desire to
be a footballer because it runs counter to other desires
and is not consistent with his critical reasoning. Yet,
on the responsiveness-to-reason account of auton-
omy, Mark will qualify as being autonomous if he
tries to change his life in accordance with his criti-
cal reasoning, that is, if he tries to modify or repudiate
his desire to be a footballer in response to his rea-
soning.
For the sake of the argument in this article, it is
not important to argue in favor of one or the other
account of being autonomous. The crucial thing is
to illustrate that – across different influential accounts
of autonomy – endorsing one’s desires and values in
light of critical reflection is a key property of
autonomy.
The basic understanding of autonomous agency
and being autonomous just outlined is a proper
foundation for the discussion in this article because it
appeals to two distinct and significant approaches to
autonomy. On the one hand, our account of
autonomous agency appeals to hedonistic intuitions
because it claims that the satisfaction of (the right)
desires is the single most important feature about
autonomy. On the other hand, our account of
being autonomous appeals to rationalistic intuitions
because it claims that rational acceptance of one’s
desires is key.
In spite of this dual approach, we are aware that
we cannot capture all significant approaches to
autonomy. Most notably, we cannot account for
important Kantian intuitions. For instance, if Sam is
good to Sally – though he, at the bottom of his
heart, desires to hurt her – then Sam exercises
autonomy to a greater extent (on a Kantian account
of autonomy) than he would have had he been good
to Sally because he desired to be good to her (Kant,
2005). Sometimes, autonomy is about overriding
one’s desires – regardless of whether they match
higher order desires or are endorsed in light of
critical reflection.
To sum up: autonomous agency is a question of
alignment or match between effective and funda-
mental desires, whereas being autonomous is a
question of endorsement of one’s fundamental desires
in light of critical reflection. We elaborate on the
concepts of being autonomous and acting autono-
mously later on.
Three accusations against marketing
We know of no argument that demonstrates a
positive link between marketing and personal
autonomy. Rather, the main background theories
consist of arguments demonstrating that marketing
compromises autonomy. In what follows, we briefly
state the general tension between marketing and
autonomy and then present influential accusations
that marketing overrules either (i) the development
of autonomy, (ii) autonomous action, or (iii) being
an autonomous person.
Imagine, for example, that powerful marketing
induces in Martha a strong effective desire to fulfill
an ideal of beauty. On critical reflection, Martha
finds the ideal rather oppressive and, as a conse-
quence, she wants not to act on it and repudiates her
desire to act so. However, due to the massive
influence of marketing, her desire to fulfill the ideal
remains effective and drives her to action. In this
case, marketing overrules both (i) autonomous
agency (because it makes the agent act on an effec-
tive desire that runs counter to her fundamental
desires) and (ii) being an autonomous person (be-
cause it makes the agent hold a desire that she
repudiates in light of critical reflection).
Let us now turn to the distinct accusations.
Raley (2006) claims that advertising to children
erodes their ability to develop into autonomous
persons. She distinguishes between three properties
of autonomy: authenticity (convergence between
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choices and desires), independence (freedom from
coercion), and competence (the ability to evaluate
choices rationally). Her charge is that marketing to
children contains claims that are supported by irra-
tional types of evidence and arguments and that
children take up this irrational line of reasoning as a
regulative ideal because they are very literal minded
and understand ads as literal truths. As a result, ads
impoverish children’s ability for rational reasoning
(her third property of autonomy).
Crisp (1987) claims that marketing undermines
the basis for autonomous action. Basically, his
argument rests on two premises. First, rational
decision making, where agents weigh competing
reasons for doing or omitting an action, is a pre-
condition for autonomous agency. Second, mar-
keting communications that associatively link values
– which are not an integral part of the product or
organization’s functionality – to products, and
organizations tend to induce desires in consumers
without their knowledge. Crisp draws the conclu-
sion that, when driven by such unknown or sub-
conscious marketing induced desires, the consumer
never has the opportunity to weigh the reasons for
so acting – and thereby violates a necessary pre-
condition for autonomy – because the subconscious
nature of the desires makes them epistemically
inaccessible.
For Sneddon (2001), autonomy involves assessing
whether (i) our values are consistent with our desires
and (ii) our values are desirable. The second condi-
tion – which he takes to be the most valuable
property of autonomy – requires access to values
distinct from one’s own and an openness to consider
other ways of living. And it is precisely this
requirement (access to alternate values and openness
to other ways of living) that Sneddon believes mar-
keting undermines. The core of the argument is the
claim that marketing has an inherent tendency to
promote a narrow, uniform set of values (all based on
the meta-value of consumption) and thus necessarily
homogenizes the cultural horizon of alternate values
necessary for being autonomous (i.e., reflecting
critically on the desirability of one’s values).
Note, that we will not discuss whether we find
the accusations justified or not, since, even if they
are justified, it does not affect our arguments. We
would certainly have to contradict arguments
showing that being subject to marketing turns a
person – on the whole – into a non-autonomous
being, but not even the hardliners’ argument is that
strong. Sneddon (2001), for instance, who makes the
rather strong claim that marketing harms both the
ability for developing autonomy as well as the option
for exercising it, does so without holding that mar-
keting entirely eliminates personal autonomy. We
do not take it to be necessary to refute the arguments
of the hardliners because we assume – based on the
actual arguments of the hardliners – that being
subject to marketing that is hostile to one’s auton-
omy does not rule out having autonomy at the same
time but in another respect.
Convergent and divergent marketing
In the course of writing this article, we analyzed
various brands, advertisements, and product place-
ments. We discovered a very basic distinction be-
tween two types of marketing or two ways of linking
values to products and organizations. We have not
been able to find any articles or textbooks that
describe the distinction, and so in what follows, we
name and describe the distinction.
The distinction concerns the way marketing
communications address the consumer. Convergent
marketing, on the one hand, addresses the consumer
as he or she is and tries to target the consumer’s
actual set of beliefs, desires, hopes, dreams, and so
forth. Divergent marketing, on the other hand, tries
to change the personal identity of the consumer by
transforming his or her web of beliefs, desires, hopes,
dreams, and so forth. Convergent marketing that,
say, appeals to the consumer’s dream universe tries to
link a product or organization to the consumer’s
actual dream of X, Y, Z. In contrast, divergent
marketing would try to transform the consumer’s
actual dream universe of X, Y, Z into a dream of
A, B, C and then link the product or organization to
that new dream universe.
The formal definitions of convergent and diver-
gent marketing are as follows:
Convergent marketing attempts to induce a desire
or preference by triggering the consumer’s actual values
and making him or her associate these values with a
product or organization. The strategic marketing
communications intentionally converge on the
consumer’s value system.
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The ad for Boss shoes (Figure 1) illustrates the
nature of convergent marketing because it does not
introduce new values but appeals to the existing
view of the businessman as a person with power,
success, and wealth.
Divergent marketing attempts to induce a desire
or preference by creating new values in the mind of the
consumer and making him or her associate those new
values with a product or an organization. Aiming to
transform the consumer’s value system, the strategic
marketing communications intentionally diverge
from the consumer’s value system.
The ad for Dove (Figure 2) is an instance of
divergent marketing in that Dove (i) intentionally
attempts to change the way the target group views
beauty to create a more inclusive, less stereotyped
ideal of beauty and (ii) tries to make the consumer
feel or believe that Dove’s product line facilitates this
new value of ‘‘real beauty’’ (Dove, 2007).
It will prove useful to consider how to draw the
line between divergent and convergent campaigns as
well as saying a few words about the frequency of
the two types of marketing.
Convergent and divergent marketing are not
absolute concepts. A marketing campaign can be
convergent or divergent to a greater or lesser degree.
Moreover, a campaign might incorporate elements
of both a convergent and divergent approach. Along
these lines, one might argue that the ad for Boss
shoes is not only convergent, as illustrated above, but
also partly divergent insofar as some consumers
might not associate being in business with the values
conveyed by the ad. This observation leads to the
question of how we decide whether an ad is prin-
cipally convergent or divergent. Three suggestions
are at hand.
One could hold that whether a campaign is
divergent or convergent comes down to (i) how the
individual consumer perceives the ad (subjectivism);
or (ii) how the target group perceives the ad (inter-
subjectivism); or (iii) the purpose of the message that
the ad agency/company wants to communicate
(intentionalism). We suggest distinguishing between
convergent and divergent campaigns in terms of
how the target group conceives of the ad (inter-
subjectivism). Our rationale is twofold.
First, imagine a case where a very small group of
consumers experience a campaign, say the ad for
Boss shoes, to be divergent whereas most others or
even all other consumers conceive of it as being
convergent. In cases such as this where the distri-
bution of perception is very asymmetric, it seems
odd to buy into the subjectivist conclusion that the
campaign is both convergent and divergent or vice
versa. A more proper answer would be to say that we
are dealing with a convergent campaign but that a
number of consumers do not experience it to be so.
Second, intentionalism seems implausible because
it allows for a campaign, which most or even all
consumers experience as, say, convergent to be
characterized as divergent if that is what it was
intended to be. And vice versa. This is not credible.
If a campaign, such as the one for Boss shoes, was
Figure 1. Boss.
Figure 2. Dove.
Liberating Marketing
intended to be divergent, but most consumers and,
indeed, the ones in the target group conceived of it
as being convergent, then it would be fair to say that
the message did not come across; rather than that the
campaign is divergent though consumers experience
it as being convergent.
With regard to the prevalence of convergent and
divergent marketing, we have no statistical data.
However, it is worth noting that commercial mar-
keting and global branding are quite often accused of
homogenizing the ‘‘value horizon,’’ i.e., the total set
of values in a culture at a given time (Sneddon, 2001;
Waide, 1987). Most notably, Ritzer proposes his
McDonaldization thesis that marketing and global
branding have a significant power to even out cul-
tural diversity (Ritzer, 1998, 2006). This criticism
suggests that it is quite commonplace to assume that
the nature of commercial marketing is, by and large,
convergent. See, for instance, Miller (1995) or
Gabriel and Lang (2006) for illuminating discussions
of the influence of marketing on cultural values.
Dove’s ‘‘Campaign for Real Beauty’’ is probably
one of the most clear-cut examples of divergent
marketing, but the very enterprise of divergent mar-
keting is by no means a rarity. Ikea launched a mar-
keting campaign in Spain, which encourages people
to break the societal rules that govern our use of
colors and patterns, among others, by encouraging
men to use ‘‘women-colors’’ such as red, cherry, and
pink (see Figure 3). In a marketing campaign con-
sisting of national flags, in which the colors on the
various flags symbolize a striking social or political
issue, the Portuguese news magazine Grande Repor-
tagem invites the consumer to reflect on political is-
sues such as just distribution (see Figure 4). The black
and the red colors that take up the majority of the
space on the flag represent people infected by HIV
and malaria. The tiny bit of yellow represents people
with access to medical care. United Colors of
Benetton has won a number of awards for their
thought-provoking campaigns that clearly intend to
make the consumer reflect on social, cultural, and
political issues. One telling example is the ‘‘Angel and
Devil’’ campaign featuring a white girl and a black
boy. The black boy’s hair is styled into horns, thereby
establishing a direct reference to the Devil. The
campaign obviously intends to confront cultural
prejudice and make the consumer reflect on and
evaluate his or her actual beliefs (see Figure 5).
All of above mentioned marketing campaigns are
instances of divergent marketing because they either
try to break down or confront existing cultural
values rather than just affirm the consumer’s actual
Figure 3. Ikea.
Figure 4. Grande Reportagem.
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value universe, as would have been the case with
convergent marketing.
In the next two sections, we put forward our
arguments in favor of a positive link between mar-
keting and autonomy.
How convergent marketing reinforces
autonomy
In this section, we argue that convergent marketing
may reinforce autonomous agency. The argument
builds on Frankfurt’s (1971) hierarchical theory of
free or autonomous agency that continues to influ-
ence much of the contemporary philosophical study
on autonomy (Arpaly and Schroeder, 1999; Boysen,
2004; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002; Rosner, 2000;
Rostbøll, 2004; Stump, 1988; Watson, 1975). In
order to understand the hierarchical account of
freedom and understand why it is ‘‘hierarchical,’’ it is
critical first to clarify the distinction between first-
and second-order desires.
A first-order desire refers to an action and has the
form ‘‘A wants to X,’’ where ‘‘A’’ stands for an agent
and ‘‘X’’ for an action. A second-order desire refers
to a first-order desire and has the form ‘‘A wants to
want to X.’’ Effective first-order desires drive an
agent all the way to action, whereas second-order
desires are not in themselves effective (Frankfurt,
1971, pp. 7–10). A crucial feature is that the two
levels of desires are independent: one can have one
without the other, and the levels need not be in
harmony. For instance, an agent may have a first-
order desire to X even though he or she has a con-
flicting second-order desire not to desire to X. That
was exactly what happened to Ted in our previous
example: he had a desire for a doughnut but also a
desire not to have that desire. Another important
aspect is that second-order desires are more deeply
integrated in the agent’s self in the sense that the
agent identifies more deeply with his or her second-
order desires than with his or her first-order desires
(Frankfurt, 1971, p. 13).1 Accordingly, Frankfurt
frequently conceptualizes second-order desires with
which the agent identifies him- or herself as ‘‘true
desires’’ reflecting what the agent ‘‘really wants.’’
Having laid out this background information, we
can now state our concept of autonomous action.
An agent acts autonomously to the extent that he or
she acts on a first-order desire that matches a second-
order desire with which the agent identifies him- or
herself. Perhaps, it seems superfluous to state that the
agent has to identify him- or herself with the sec-
ond-order desire, but agents may have distorted
second-order desires that they feel estranged from.
Intuitively, acting on estranged second-order desires
cannot count as autonomous agency, insofar as no
one really desires to be alienated from one’s doings.
Note that the direction of match or alignment
between first- and second-order desires is decisive. If
an agent adjusts his or her first-order desires to his or
her second-order desires and acts accordingly, then
he or she acts autonomously. However, if the agent
adjusts his or her second-order desires to his or her
first-order desires and acts accordingly, then he or
she does not act autonomously. The proper match or
alignment is a top–down process. The rationale is
that second-order desires reflect what the agent
really or truly wants, whereas first-order desires may
only reflect trivial or even undesirable desires. On
this background, philosophers often refer to the
different variants and developments of this theory of
autonomy as ‘‘hierarchical accounts of autonomy.’’
We now turn to a scenario that demonstrates the
positive impact that convergent marketing may have
on autonomous agency.
Terry is an IT-consultant, spending long hours in
front of his laptop and in his car driving to see cli-
ents. During the last couple of years, Terry has had
increasing problems with his diet and by now he
is quite overweight. In his own view, he consumes
on the way too many soft drinks and too much
Figure 5. Benetton.
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unhealthy fast food, such as burgers and pizza. He
really wants to do something about the problem, but
he has not succeeded in motivating himself to
actually choose a healthier life style.
Terry has a second-order desire to take on a
healthier lifestyle (e.g., buy and consume healthy
foods), but he cannot bring about an efficient first-
order desire to actually do this. According to our
interpretation of autonomous action, Terry’s inabil-
ity to motivate himself to do what he really wants to
do (that is, to act on a particular set of second-order
desires) turns Terry into a non-autonomous agent
(in relation to that specific set of second-order
desires).
Now, imagine that Terry is subject to a series of
extraordinarily effective marketing campaigns fea-
turing a character heavily associated with health,
whom Terry conceives of as a role model. The
campaign goes on for weeks and has a significant
power to induce desires for healthy living. As a
consequence, Terry is effectively motivated to take
on a healthier life style, i.e., he is motivated to
actually buy and eat more fruits and vegetables and
consume fewer soft drinks and less fast food.
Deploying the terminology of first- and second-
order desires, one can say that the marketing cam-
paign induces effective first-order desires that match a
set of second-order desires with which Terry iden-
tifies himself and on which he would not have acted
had he not been subject to the brand campaign. In
other words, the marketing campaign makes it pos-
sible for Terry to act on significant second-order
desires and thereby brings to life a set of autonomous
actions that were otherwise inaccessible to Terry
because he could not form the corresponding effec-
tive first-order desires of his own will.
How will the hardliners who claim that marketing
undermines autonomy respond to this argument?
Hardliners relying on a hierarchical account of
autonomy will have to bite the bullet because we
arrive at our conclusion from their assumptions
about autonomy and marketing. The assumptions
are that (i) autonomous action is a question of
aligning first-order desires with second-order ones
and (ii) effective marketing induces desires for buy-
ing products.
Hardliners sympathetic to the rationalistic concept
of autonomy outlined above will hold that some-
thing more than identification is needed in order to
turn a match between first- and second-order desires
into genuine autonomy. Specifically, they will argue
that a match between a first- and a second-order
desire qualifies as autonomy only if the agent
holds the first-order desire in light of and because of
rational assessment and endorsement of the second-
order desire in question. And Terry quite obviously
does not hold his newly formed first-order desire for
healthy products because of critical assessment and
endorsement of his second-order desire to lead a
healthy life. The causal explanation of the formation
of his first-order desire lies in the fact that he has
been subject to marketing, and, consequently, the
example of Terry does not show that marketing can
enhance autonomy.
In reply to this, consider the following. First, one
might fear that the requirement of critical assessment
and endorsement is so strong that it reduces auton-
omous agency to a very marginal human phenom-
enon. Whether this is so is an empirical matter that
we cannot settle here.
Second, consider situations where an agent can-
not bring about first-order desires that correspond
to some of his or her key second-order desires.
Here it is rational to prefer marketing-induced first-
order desires that match the second-order desires in
question because the alternative is an incapability to
do what one really wants to do. Hence, if mar-
keting of healthy food can make Terry do what he
really wants to do (and if he cannot do this on his
own), then why should he – as a rational agent –
choose not to be subject to marketing of healthy
food?
How divergent marketing reinforces
autonomy
In this section, we argue that divergent marketing
may reinforce the state of being autonomous. The
argument builds on the rationalistic account of being
an autonomous person set forth by Sneddon (2001).
The account is heavily influenced by the works of
Taylor (1985a, b) and roughly parallel to the concept
of autonomy found in Rawls (1971, pp. 513–520)
and Dworkin (1988).
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An agent is autonomous to the extent that he or
she assesses:
(i) What his or her values are and whether his
or her first-order desires are consistent with
these values.
(ii) Whether the values themselves are desirable
(Sneddon, 2001, p. 18).
Thus, being autonomous involves more than the
matching of first-order desires with second-order
desires. But what more is needed? Sneddon answers
as follows:
The exercise of… autonomy requires the assessment of
the structure of one’s life against the background of other
actual and possible ways of living (2001, pp. 18–19).
The root idea is that an agent is autonomous to
the extent that he or she endorses her basic values
after having subjected them to a rational process of
critical evaluation in light of other possible values or
other ways of living. On this basis, Sneddon claims
that marketing as such undermines autonomy in two
ways. First, by homogenizing the horizon of values
that the individual can access to reflect critically on
the desirability of her own values. Second, by
counteracting the willingness to exercise autonomy
(i.e., to engage in critical reflection on one’s values).
Here is an illustrating quote:
Instead of portraying ways of living significantly dif-
ferent from those being lived by the people exposed to
advertising, advertisers will be rewarded by tapping
into what already appeals to people living these sorts of
life (2001, p. 22).
And he concludes that ‘‘advertising, as an insti-
tution devoted to the strengthening of one way of
living, works against having knowledge of other
ways of living (2001, p. 22).’’ As mentioned in the
section ‘‘Convergent and divergent marketing,’’ the
view that marketing is a process of cultural
homogenization is far from peripheral.
In what follows, we will provide an analysis of a
set of ads that clearly demonstrate that – given
Sneddon’s account of autonomy – divergent mar-
keting may contribute positively to important
properties of autonomy.
Dove’s brand campaign ‘‘Campaign for Real
Beauty’’ is not just a paradigm case of divergent
marketing. The campaign is also a clear-cut example
of divergent marketing that reinforces autonomy.
Dove goes upstream and presents wrinkled, chubby
and gray-haired models that under normal condi-
tions would not have found their way to the bill-
boards of the cityscape. Take, for instance, the ad of
the charismatic, wrinkled woman (see Figures 6, 7).
The text says: ‘‘When did beauty become limited
by age? It’s time to think, talk and learn how to
make beauty real again. Join Dove and the debate at
campaignforrealbeauty.com.’’
The same figure goes with an alternate text:
‘‘Wrinkled? Wonderful? Can 96 be beautiful? Text
your vote to 43683 [4Dove] (A) for wrinkled. (B)
for wonderful.’’
Two things are decisive about these ads. On the
one hand, Dove explicitly encourages the persons
exposed to the ads to reflect upon the relation be-
tween beauty, age, and being wrinkled. (In another
set of ads, they invite us to reflect on the relation
between body-size and attractiveness). On the other
hand, Dove is not just facilitating a debate; they are
Figure 6. Dove.
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active players who take a stance. Their official mis-
sion is to change the way society views beauty to
create a more inclusive ideal of beauty that does not
thwart women’s self-esteem. Dove is actually trying
to make a new and more inclusive ideal of beauty.
In this way, Dove actually promotes, or seeks to
promote, two properties of autonomy that Sneddon
claims to be at odds with marketing. First, the brand
campaign encourages reflection on one’s values in
light of relevantly different alternate values. Second,
the brand campaign proposes new and relevantly
different cultural values that provide a proper
background for assessing the desirability of one’s
values and desires.
What would Sneddon reply to this? Perhaps that
divergent marketing only apparently reinforces
important properties of autonomy. Dove, the argu-
ment goes, introduces a new ideal of beauty designed
to improve the bases of self-esteem, but only appar-
ently so, because the true purpose of the brand
campaign is to emphasize the value of consumption
and raise profits.
In response to this, we will note two points. First,
our purpose is to show that marketing can contrib-
ute positively to personal autonomy, and this point
remains unaffected by the envisaged objection.
Second, though it is true that the motive behind an
action sometimes determines the normative status of
that action, the motive is not significant in all situ-
ations. When we want to praise or blame a person or
an organization, the motive behind the relevant set
of actions is often crucial, but this does not imply
that actions having overall good consequences are
non-moral actions just because ‘‘moral good’’ or
‘‘empathetic concern’’ is not the primary driving
motive behind these actions. Thus, it is meaningful
to hold that Dove does not deserve moral praise for
its ‘‘Campaign for Real Beauty’’ (because the driving
motive after all is making a profit), but it is erroneous
to conclude that the campaign is without positive
moral significance (in so far as it reinforces autonomy
and thereby brings about a moral good to some
consumers).
Yet, even though we acknowledge the mean-
ingfulness of not attributing praise to Dove insofar as
their driving motive is making a profit, we actually
do believe that their campaign deserves moral praise
because we assume that they could have chosen to
create an alternative campaign having the same
economic impact, but without any positive social
impact.
Concluding remarks
Prior research on marketing and personal autonomy
has either focused on how and why many modern
types of marketing conflict with personal autonomy
(this is by far the most predominant approach) or
tried to demonstrate how and why these types of
marketing are, after all, very often compatible with
autonomy. In contrast, the purpose of this article was
to pursue a positive link between marketing and
autonomy. Thus, we have argued that marketing has
a potential to reinforce autonomous agency and the
state of being an autonomous person.
First, we outlined a hierarchical theory of auton-
omous action that, by and large, holds that an agent
acts autonomously to the extent that he or she acts on
effective desires (first-order desires) that accord with
what he or she really wants (second-order desires).
Then we constructed a hypothetical scenario that
– given the account of autonomy – intuitively
demonstrated how marketing could reinforce
autonomous agency.
Second, we sketched a rationalistic theory of
being an autonomous person that, roughly speaking,
takes a person to be autonomous to the extent that
Figure 7. Dove.
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he or she endorses his or her personal desires and
values after having subjected them to rational,
critical reflection. We carried out an analysis of a
marketing campaign that – given the account of
autonomy – intuitively demonstrated how market-
ing could reinforce significant properties of being an
autonomous person.
Note
1 It is a logical possibility that an agent identifies him-
or herself most deeply with his or her first-order desires.
That possibility is an interesting borderline case, but it is
beyond the scope of this article to pursue the point any
further.
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